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THE USE OF SECTION 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
TO ATTACK LARGE
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Peter C. Carstensent and Nina H. Questaltt
The unprecedented wave of merger activity in the 1960's and
197 0's spawned a new antitrust problem: what to do about the
many large firms seeking to acquire other large companies en-
gaged in businesses unrelated to their own. These so-called "con-
glomerate mergers"-lacking the horizontal or vertical characteris-
tics of most traditional mergers-raised substantial questions as to
the applicability of section 7 of the Clayton Act,' the basic antitrust
law regulating corporate combinations. To date, legal discussion of
conglomerate mergers has centered on whether and when such
combinations are sufficiently anticompetitive to trigger the appli-
cation of section 7. This approach is unsatisfactory. Massive merg-
ers may be undesirable even if they are not anticompetitive. We
suggest, therefore, that attention should focus on section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act 2 as a potentially useful weapon for
combatting conglomerate mergers. Evaluating these mergers as
possible "unfair acts" under section 5 would obviate the need for a
showing of probable anticompetitiveness in traditional economic
terms, and would therefore provide antitrust enforcers with great-
er flexibility and effectiveness in challenging undesirable conglom-
erate combinations.
This Article will demonstrate that section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, in light of its legislative history and evolv-
ing Supreme Court interpretation, is an appropriate mechanism
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1964, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin; LL.B., M.A. 1968, Yale University.
tt Member, Wisconsin Bar; attorney, Federal Trade Commission. B.A. 1973, J.D.
1976, University of Wisconsin. The views expressed herein are strictly those of the authors
and do not in any way represent the positions of any agency or institution with which they
are or have been associated.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
' Id. § 45. The section provides: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared un-
lawful." Id. § 45(a)(1).
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for dealing with conglomerate mergers. In advocating the use of
section 5, we will first identify the inadequacies of the Clayton Act
as a vehicle for controlling this problem. We then will trace the
development of section 5; describe how it has been used in the
context of antitrust-related activity in the past; show that both an-
titrust policy and more general social concerns provide bases for
challenging conglomerate combinations as "unfair acts"; propose a
rule for implementing a section 5 prohibition; and finally, evaluate
the merits of such an approach for dealing with the conglomerate
merger problem.
We emphasize at the outset that we are concerned with only
those conglomerate mergers involving firms that are large in abso-
lute terms.3 We limit our discussion to large conglomerate mergers
for three reasons. First, although we are not willing to accept the
proposition that bigness is intrinsically bad, we do fear the trans-
formation of many large firms into fewer, larger firms. To the
extent that large firms have advantages over small ones in terms of
survival, growth, or efficiency, we think it important that the
number of large firms not be decreased. Second, although we rec-
ognize the dangers present when large firms acquire small firms,
we feel that conglomerate mergers between large firms involve a
quantum leap in terms of corporate growth, and that such instan-
taneous augmentation of size and power is particularly undesirable.
Finally, we are pragmatists. Perhaps the law should bar most, or
even all, acquisitions by major firms. We sense, however, that social
mistrust of large conglomerate mergers is particularly acute. Regu-
lation of these combinations thus provides a proper point of depar-
ture in the development of a doctrine of unfair mergers.
I
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT
In December 1975, the directors of General Electric Company
(GE) and Utah International (UI) announced the proposed merger
of the two companies.4 The merger, one of the largest in United
3 We focus in this Article on mergers that may lack significant anticompetitive effect.
We do not mean to imply, however, that mergers with more direct anticompetitive implica-
tions fall outside the analysis set forth in this Article. In such cases, the FTC should have
the option of invoking either traditional antitrust theory or the unfairness analysis we pro-
pose.
4 See Boards of GE, Utah International Clear Talks for $1.9 Billion Merger, Wall St. J., Dec.
16, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
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States history, was consummated about a year later.5 GE's 1975
sales of $13.4 billion ranked it ninth on Fortune's list of the largest
industrial corporations; UI, with $686 million in sales, ranked
273rd.6 GE's profits in 1975 totaled $580.8 million and U's $111.6
million.7 In terms of assets, GE and UI ranked 11th and 159th,
respectively, on the 1975 Fortune list.8
UI's principal business was mining coal, iron ore, uranium,
and copper. Overseas mineral properties generated ninety percent
of its earnings.9 The company also had interests in land develop-
ment, ocean shipping, and oil and gas properties. GE's primary
business was in manufacturing electrical equipment, appliances,
and various capital goods. Except for the possibility of some in-
teraction between GE's activities in building atomic reactors and
UI's interests in uranium mining, a small element of UI's business,
the two firms' operations did not overlap. The deal represented a
nearly pure conglomerate merger.' 0 Moreover, the facts revealed
no apparent efficiency justifications."
After a lengthy investigation, the Department of Justice
granted the merger a clearance. 12 The Antitrust Division con-
See Kraar, General Electric's Very Personal Merger, FORTUNE, Aug. 1977, at 194.




9 Kraar, supra note 5, at 187.
10 A pure conglomerate merger is one in which the merging parties have neither a
horizontal nor a vertical relationship; i.e., they are neither competitors, nor supplier and
customer. See E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 205 (1974).
11 UI's chairman asserted that the merger would give his company access to GE's
sophisticated research and development capabilities and other resources, thus enabling UI
"to take advantage of more and greater opportunities in the mining field." Boards of GE,
Utah International Clear Talks for $1.9 Billion Merger, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
The chairman of GE explained his company's motivations in terms of enhancing interna-
tional business and providing "a probable hedge" against inflation. GE Sees Proposed Merger
as Providing Inflation Hedge, Aid to Business Abroad, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at 18, col. 1.
One observer concluded, however, that "[m]ore than anything else, this merger has in fact
served to fulfill the needs and ambitions of the two men who conceived it." Kraar, supra
note 5, at 187. U's chairman, according to Kraar, sought a lessening of certain risks to U1
shareholders-of which he was among the largest-and, rather than diversifying UI, "was
willing to trade off some of his company's fantastic growth to get it." Id. GE's chairman
"wanted to make a lasting imprint on his corporation." Id. GE, contrary to its general'
practice, is operating UI as a separate and independent subsidiary having little or no rela-
tion to the rest of the company. Id. at 194.
"See Justice Dep't Gives Green Light to Revised GE-Utah International Merger, [1976]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 783, at A-19. See also Merger of GE, Utah Inter-
national Fails to Gain Business Review Clearance, [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 774, at A-9.
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fronted an obvious problem: the lack of an adequate legal-
economic theory under section 7 of the Clayton Act to justify a
challenge to the merger. Central to the application of section 7 in
this context is the requisite finding that the merger "may . . .
substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a
monopoly."' 3 By focusing the key inquiry on possible anticompeti-
tive effects, this requirement severely limits attacks upon conglom-
erate mergers.
Since the 1950's, when the trend in corporate mergers shifted
from strictly horizontal or vertical combinations toward acquisitions
aimed at diversifications,' 4 the problem of controlling conglomer-
ate mergers has intensified. In the wake of this trend, both the
FTC and the Antitrust Division have attempted to use section 7 to
block conglomerate mergers.' 5 The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States16 invited these efforts: "[B]y the deletion of the
'acquiring-acquired' language . .. [Congress] hoped to make plain
that § 7 applied not only to mergers between actual competitors,
but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers whose effect may
tend to lessen competition in any line of commerce in any section
of the country."' 7 Other post-amendment decisions lent support to
a liberal reading of the "substantially lessen competition" standard
of section 7.18
3 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
14 See P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 154-57 (1975). Recent data
suggest that the trend toward large conglomerate mergers still continues. See FTC BUREAU
OF ECONOMICS, STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 3, 105-06 (1977).
15See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
16 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1 7
Id. at 317 (footnotes omitted).
18 Although not a pure conglomerate merger, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965), involved an expanded use of § 7. Consolidated, a food processor, whole-
saler, and retailer, acquired Gentry, a producer of dehydrated onions and garlic. The
Court found a § 7 violation based on the theory of reciprocity. Consolidated had informed
its suppliers that, in return for Consolidated's business, they would be expected to buy
from Gentry. This would foreclose other onion and garlic manufacturers from competing
for the business of Consolidated's suppliers. Id. at 593-95, 600. See also United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), involved a product extension
merger between the leading detergent producer and Clorox Chemical Co., manufacturer
of the leading household liquid bleach. The Court found two bases for a § 7 violation:
first, the merger would probably increase Clorox's advantage in the liquid bleach market
by raising barriers to entry; and second, the merger resulted in the loss of potential compe-
[Vol. 63:841
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As the combinations under review took on a purely conglom-
erate quality, however, courts began to reject section 7 attacks. In
United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 19 the Government sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the consolidation of Northwest
Industries and B.F. Goodrich, two of the' country's 100 largest cor-
porations. Rejecting the Government's economic concentration ar-
gument, the court denied injunctive relief:
While it is certainly more probable that the consolidation of two
of the country's corporate giants may have anti-competitive re-
sults in one or more lines of commerce, the Government con-
tends that they are inherent in such mergers because of the great
economic power resulting therefrom even though there is no
competitive relationship between them....
There may be very good reasons indeed to limit the growth
of this country's largest corporations, particularly through merg-
ers and acquisitions. . . . The law as it now stands, however,
makes the adverse effect on competition the test of validity and
until Congress broadens the criteria, the Court must judge pro-
posed transactions on that standard.2 0
In United States v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.
(ITT),21 section 7 litigation involving ITT's acquisition of Grinnell
Corporation, the court found that the Government had failed to
demonstrate a substantial lessening of competition:
The Court declines the government's invitation to indulge
in an expanded reading of the statutory language and holds that
the statute means just what it says. It proscribes only those merg-
ers the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen compe-
tition"; it commands that the alleged anticompetitive effects be
tition, since it eliminated Procter & Gamble as the most likely potential entrant into the
bleach market. Id. at 578-79.
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968), also rested on a liberal interpretation of § 7. The court upheld an FTC order that
General Foods, a producer and distributor of packaged foods, divest itself of SOS, a lead-
ing soap pad producer. The Commission had found that General Foods' acquisition of SOS
would substantially increase barriers to entry for potential entrants. 386 F.2d at 946-47. Cf.
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (unsuccessful competing
bidders held competitors under § 7); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964) (joint ventures within purview of § 7).
19 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2 0 Id. at 1096.
21 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970). See 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (denial of
Government's motion for preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
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examined in the context of specific product and geographic
markets; and it does not proscribe those mergers the effect of
which may be substantially to increase economic concentration. 22
Even in the few cases holding that conglomerate mergers may
violate the antitrust laws, the courts have focused on specific prob-
lems raised by the particular combination in issue, rather than on
broader social and economic effects. For example, in United States v.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,23 the court enjoined a proposed
conglomerate merger where the Government demonstrated that
the resulting entity could possess inter-market leverage or "recip-
rocal" power.24 Although noting the "new problems" associated
with conglomerate mergers-such as increased economic concen-
tration-the court confined its focus to traditional antitrust stand-
ards, declining to consider the Government's contention that the
"size and structure of [the two merging firms] may have anti-com-
petitive effects transcending any single product market.
25
Neither Northwest Industries,26 ITT,27 nor the few cases finding
Clayton Act violations28 received Supreme Court review. As a re-
sult, the judicial posture regarding conglomerate mergers remains
uncertain. Meanwhile, the scholarly debate has continued in full
force.2 9 Some advocate the complete legality of conglomerate merg-
ers. 30 These observers believe not only that the mergers lack anti-
22 324 F. Supp. at 54. See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 73,619 (N.D. Ill.) (complaint challenging ITT's acquisition of Canteen Corp.
dismissed on merits).
23 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
24 1d. at 1398. The Third Circuit has also recognized the concept of reciprocity as a
basis for disallowing conglomerate mergers. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524-25 (3d Cir. 1963).
25 323 F. Supp. at 1400.
26 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
2 7 See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
73,665 (D. Conn.) (consent decree in litigation over ITT's acquisition of Grinnell Corp.).
See also United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
73,666 (D. Conn.) (consent decree in litigation over ITTs acquisition of Hartford Fire
Insurance Co.); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
73,667 (N.D. Ill.) (consent decree in litigation over ITT's acquisition of Canteen Corp.).
2 See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
29 See, e.g., P. STEINER, supra note 14; Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws,
73 COLU . L. REV. 555 (1973); Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The
Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 (1968); Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1965).
30 See Coase, Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition: The
Conglomerate Merger, 115 CONG. REC. 15,938 (1969); Bicks, Comegys, Jr. & Lewis, Con-
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competitive effect, but also that they occur solely because of eco-
nomic efficiencies. Donald Turner, prior to taking charge of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division, took a less extreme posi-
tion, and argued that weak quantitative information on the effects
of large corporate acquisitions required antitrust prosecutors to
proceed with caution against conglomerate mergers. "[O]ne cannot
support an attack of much greater breadth on conglomerates,"
Turner stated, "without trenching on significant economic and
other values, and therefore without an unprecedented reliance on
judgments of an essentially political nature."'31 Furthermore, ac-
cording to Turner, Congress properly minimized the courts' bur-
den of balancing social and economic interests by focusing atten-
tion on anticompetitive effect:
I do not believe Congress has given the courts and the FTC
a mandate to campaign against "superconcentration" in the ab-
sence of any evidence of harm to competition. In light of the
bitterly disputed issues involved, I believe that the courts should
demand of Congress that it translate any further directive into
something more formidable than sonorous phrases in the pages
of the Congressional Record.
32
Professor Blake, on the other hand, contends that any substan-
tial acquisition by a large firm injures competition.3 3 He argues that
section 7 is therefore applicable to large conglomerate mergers
regardless of the extent to which the businesses of the merging
glomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 28 Bus. LAW. 83, 99 (1973). But see
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssION, EcONOMIc REPORT ON CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 69-119
(1969) (app. to pt. 8 of Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust &
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)) (empirical evi-
dence suggests that 1960's merger movement not explainable in terms of performance
criteria); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEO. L.J. 672, 679-83
(1958) (conglomerate acquisitions have little claim to promoting economic efficiency).
31 Turner, supra note 29, at 1394.
' 2 1d. at 1395. Turner's argument that courts cannot repudiate the Clayton Act's
competition-based standard is valid. It does not follow, however, that the FTC may not
invoke the Federal Trade Commission Act to challenge conglomerate mergers on grounds
other than anticompetitive effect. It is important to remember that Turner was examining
conglomerate mergers within a traditional antitrust framework, focusing on the prohibition
of substantial anticompetitive effects. It was not until National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), that a court held that
the FTC had the power to promulgate rules having the effect of substantive law-i.e.,
"rules defining the meaning of the statutory standards of the illegality the Commission is
empowered to prevent." Id. at 698. Congress has since confirmed the FTC's power to
engage in substantive rulemaking under the "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" clause
of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See notes 98 & 136 infra.
3 3 See Blake, supra note 29.
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firms overlap.34 Blake states that one of the primary purposes of
the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment was "to limit future in-
creases in the level of economic concentration resulting from cor-
porate mergers and acquisition. 35 Furthermore, "from the eco-
nomic data discussed in the hearings, it is clear that 'economic
concentration' referred to more than concentration in particular
markets. '36 Blake therefore advocates a strong presumption of il-
legality where both merging parties are large.
3 7
In sum, there is a broad spectrum of opinion on the possible
adverse consequences of large conglomerate mergers. 38 From our
own standpoint, we do not regard it as proven that large conglom-
erate mergers lack the requisite anticompetitive potential for the
purposes of section 7 of the Clayton Act; indeed, strong arguments
exist to the contrary. 39 However, to quickly bring conglomerate
mergers under effective legal control, we urge bypassing the an-
ticompetitiveness question and formulating a fresh approach.
As a first step, regulators and commentators should shift atten-
tion away from the restrictive analytical model of section 7 with its
focus on potential anticompetitive effects, and ask instead whether
massive corporate consolidations produce any demonstrable eco-
nomic benefits. It is true that such mergers may occur because they
produce real economies or efficiencies for the parties. However,
mergers may also occur because-without producing serious
inefficiencies-they add to the prestige or wealth of those who con-
trol a corporation, 40 or because they are advantageous for tax,
accounting, or securities reasons.4' Indeed, many commentators
"4 See id. at 566-67.
35 ld. at 585 (quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950)).
26 Blake, supra note 29, at 585 (footnote omitted).
"See id. at 560; Mueller, Conglomerates: A "Nonindustay", in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERI-
CAN INDUSTRY 442, 477 (5th ed. W. Adams 1976).
38 It is worth noting that opponents of conglomerate mergers tend to approach the
subject from a social policy standpoint. In contrast, those advocating the legality of such
mergers usually take a more economic approach, with the apparent view that a combina-
tion having no significant, discernible anticompetitive potential must, ipso facto, be desir-
able. Compare Blake, supra note 29, with Coase, supra note 30. Although the logic of this
latter position derives from § 7 of the Clayton Act, it is not necessarily convincing when the
conglomerate merger problem is viewed as a matter of social-as well as economic-
concern.
39 See Blake, supra note 29, at 564-70; Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of
Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research
ed. 1955); Mueller, supra note 37.
40 See P. STEINER, supra note 14, at 75-127.
41 See id. See also Winter, Conservative Firms Bent on Profit Growth Join the Merger Chase,
Wall St. J., April 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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have suggested that although inefficiency is a constraint on corpo-
rate conduct, corporate decisions frequently rest on considerations
other than efficiency.42 In large conglomerate mergers, such as the
General Electric-Utah International combination,43 each party is
often already a leader in its market and of sufficient magnitude to
enjoy all economies of scale. It is our belief-and that of many
economists-that most conglomerate mergers are based on such
non-efficiency grounds and produce no significant or lasting eco-
nomic advantages. 44 The only efficiency argument in favor of con-
glomerate mergers that we have seen is that the threat of acquisi-
tion may produce more efficient conduct on the part of target
firms, and that the introduction of new management may result in
more efficient use of acquired firms' resources. 45 Even if this were
true, however-and we are by no means sure that it is-it does not
follow that the acquiring firms should be permitted to keep all of
their existing assets in addition to the newly acquired ones. In our
view, conglomerate mergers generally produce adverse social and
political consequences by augmenting the vast political power al-
ready possessed by large economic entities, by further centralizing
control over business assets, and by placing control over business
operations in the hands of even more distant managers.46 Despite
these justifications for regulation, to the best of our knowledge, no
one has yet undertaken a careful examination of whether any stat-
ute, aside from the Clayton Act, reaches these socially counter-
productive combinations. 47
42 See W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (rev. ed. 1967); E. PEN-
ROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 158-61 (1959); Simon, Theories of
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262-65 (1959).
43 See notes 4-11 and accompanying text supra.
44 See Blair, supra note 30; Mueller, supra note 37; Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J.
974, 987-88 (1977) (large mergers contribute little to productive efficiency). But cf. Elzinga,
The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191, 1197 (1977) (conglomerate form of business encourages takeover threats, thus
promoting managerial efficiency). Moreover, even where a merger does produce efficien-
cies, this does not establish that those efficiencies could not have been achieved by other
means. See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 189-92 (1971).
45 See P. STEINER, supra note 14, at 68-69; Elzinga, supra note 44, at 1197.
Although we do not pause to consider at length the possibility of other intrinsic ben-
efits resulting from large conglomerate mergers (see note 134 infra), none immediately
occur to us. In any case, we believe that in light of the visible negative effects of large con-
glomerate mergers, proponents should bear the burden of demonstrating that positive
benefits will generally result.
4' See notes 120-34 and accompanying text infra.
47 Subsequent to the preparation of this Article, but prior to its publication, the FTC




THE MEANING OF THE "UNFAIR" STANDARD IN THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
In 1915, Congress adopted the Federal Trade Commission
Act4" and the Clayton Act 49 in a double-barrelled effort to supple-
ment the Sherman Act.50 Although the Clayton Act was second in
order of final adoption, both houses considered the two Acts to-
gether as part of a single legislative program of strengthening the
antitrust laws. 51 Thus, passage of the Clayton Act following enact-
ment of the FTC Act did not indicate that Congress considered the
FTC Act inapplicable to mergers.
The Clayton Act set forth a series of prohibitions aimed at
specific forms of objectionable conduct, such as price discrimina-
tion, 52 tying,53 anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, 54 and in-
terlocking directorates.55 The Act also provided for a broad array
of enforcement mechanisms: criminal penalties, 56 actions by the
Justice Department to enjoin violations, 57 cease and desist orders
to be issued by the FTC and certain other agencies,58 and private
actions for treble damages and equitable relief.59
In providing a general standard to be implemented exclusively
by agency action,60 section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
embodied an entirely different approach. As originally enacted the
statute provided: "[U]nfair methods of competition in commerce
challenge conglomerate mergers. See FTC's Dougherty Envisions Challenges to Conglomerate
Mergers by Leading Firms, [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 848, at AA-1.
48 Ch. 311, §§ 1-7, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)).
49 Ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)).
50 Ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
5 "[B]oth [§ 7 of the Clayton Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act] were
enacted by the 63d Congress, and both were designed to deal with closely related aspects
of the same problem-the protection of free and fair competition in the Nation's mar-
ketplaces." United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 (1975).
52 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
.53d. § 14.
5 4 Id. § 18.
5 5 Id. § 19.
5 6 d. § 24.
57 1d. § 25.
58 Id. § 21.
I91d. §§ 15, 26.
60 Courts have held with near uniformity that private plaintiffs do not have a right of
action under § 5. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan of
the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976), noted in 29 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1976).
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are hereby declared unlawful."' 6' On its face this language evinces
an attempt to authorize the FTC to attack a wide variety of unde-
sirable business conduct. Moreover, the Act's legislative history
confirms the conclusion that Congress used sweeping language to
avoid limiting the applicability of the Act to a particular practice or
category of practices. 62 The Senate Report stated:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair
practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their con-
tinuance or whether it would, by a general declaration condemn-
ing unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what
practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would
be the better, for the reason, as stated by one of the representa-
tives of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, that there were
too many unfair practices to define. ... 63
Despite this legislative history, courts at first hesitated to
broadly define FTC power under section 5. In FTC v. Gratz,64 for
example, the Supreme Court refused to uphold a charge of un-
fairness in connection with a tying arrangement because the Com-
mission had failed to demonstrate that the arrangement tended
toward monopoly or substantially lessened competition. The Court
stated that the epithet "unfair" was "clearly inapplicable to prac-
tices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as
61 Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)).
2 See S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-19 (1914). The House Report found it "impossible to frame definitions which
embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field .... If
Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task." Id.
at 19. See FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (dicta);
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466 (1941) (dicta); Baker & Baum,
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L.
REv. 517, 527-42 (1962); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 680-81 (1977); Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History
of the Federal Trade Commission, 11 PROC. ACAD. POL Sci. 666, 667-70 (1926); Thain, Suffer
the Hucksters to Come unto the Little Children? Possible Restrictions of Television Advertising to
Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 56 B.U. L. REV. 651, 656 (1976).
63 S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). There is, however, some evidence
that Congress viewed § 5 primarily as a mechanism for combatting anticompetitive and
monopolistic practices. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMInssioN 33-38 (1924).
But cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919) (§ 5 prohibits prac-
tices that "have . .. a tendency to injure competitors directly or through deception of
purchasers").
64 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly
to hinder competition or create monopoly.
65
FTC v. Raladam Co.66 represented an even more restrictive
reading of the unfairness standard. The case involved a corporate
defendant who had advertised as "safe" a potentially lethal medici-
nal product. The Supreme Court rejected the FTC's unfairness
attack, holding that because "[t]he paramount aim of the act is the
protection of the public from the evils likely to result from the de-
struction of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial
degree, 67 the challenged conduct fell outside the ambit of section
5. "Unfair trade methods," said the Court, "are not per se unfair
methods of competition."
6 8
Just three years after Raladam, however, the Supreme Court
reversed its field. In FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 69 the Court
reasoned that the practice of selling penny candy in "break and
take"70 packages was unfair within the meaning of section 5:
[H]ere the competitive method is shown to exploit consumers,
children, who are unable to protect themselves. . . . Without
inquiring whether, as respondent contends, the criminal statutes
imposing penalties on gambling, lotteries and the like, fail to
reach this particular practice ... it is clear that the practice is of
the sort which the common law and criminal statutes have long
deemed contrary to public policy. . . . It would seem a gross
perversion of the normal meaning of the word, which is the first
criterion of statutory construction, to hold that the method is not
"unfair."71
In shifting the focus of the unfairness concept to protection of
the public, and away from protection of the wrongdoer's competi-
tors, Keppel largely undermined Raladam. Yet even in Keppel the
Court construed section 5 quite narrowly, requiring a reasonably
strong showing that the conduct in issue contravened some explicit
public policy.
72
65 Id. at 427.
66 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
67 d. at 647-48.
6 8 Id. at 649 (emphasis in original).
69 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
70 "Break and take" merchandising induced children to buy inferior candy in the hope
of obtaining, by chance, bonus packs containing extra candy and prizes. See id. at 307.71 1d. at 313.
72 The Court noted, for example, that the FTC found the challenged practice involved
an element of gambling which diverted young children from other manufacturers' goods.
See id. at 307-08.
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The Wheeler-Lea amendment7 3 of 1938 finally settled the
question of whether section 5 proscribed only anticompetitive con-
duct. The amendment broadened the section's original prohibition
against "unfair methods of competition" to include "unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices. 74 The House Report stated: "[T]his
amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair
trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant
or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest
competitor. ' 75 After passage of the amendment, "unfair competi-
tive practices were not limited to those likely to have anticompeti-
tive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws ....
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (S & H)7 7 demonstrates the
current scope of the section 5 unfairness standard. In S & H, the
Supreme Court held that the FTC could condemn under section 5
Sperry & Hutchinson's practice of seeking injunctions against busi-
ness establishments which, without authorization, redeemed or ex-
changed S & H Green Stamps. The case explicitly established FTC
authority to prosecute cases under section 5 even in the absence of
consumer deception or acts contravening the letter or spirit of the
antitrust laws.
78
7 Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (amending Act of Sept. 26, 1914,
ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)).
74 The current text of the statute is set out in note 2 supra.
In assessing conglomerate mergers, one need not apply separately the two prongs of
§ 5's unfairness standard. Conglomerate mergers may be deemed both "unfair methods of
competition" (insofar ds they contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of the antitrust laws)
and "unfair acts" (insofar as they produce consequences adverse to society in general). We
would argue that in tandem these prohibitions bring large conglomerate mergers within
the purview of § 5. Such a 'Joint application" of the two clauses finds some support in FTC
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972) (Court seems to mix two clauses in
developing liberal test) (see text following note 89 infra), and best comports with the Com-
mission's characterization of § 5 as a "dynamic analytical tool." See text accompanying note
79 infra. But even if such an approach is rejected, we believe that § 5's prohibition of
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" independently covers large conglomerate mergers.
75 H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See S. REP. No. 1705, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
76 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). See Pitofsky, supra note
62, at 680-81; Thain, supra note 62, at 658-60; Comment, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act-Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 1071, 1078. See also Scientific
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1941).
77 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
71 In S & H the Court cited with approval three factors that the FTC considered
useful in determining whether a practice that neither violates the antitrust laws nor de-
ceives consumers may nonetheless be deemed unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common
law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
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In sum, the last half-century has witnessed a dramatic growth
in the reach of section 5. As the FTC has stated, the unfairness
concept "is potentially a dynamic analytical tool capable of a pro-
gressive, evolving application which can keep pace with a rapidly
changing economy. '79 Of course, the FTC is not free to roam the
economic landscape, condemning whatever it dislikes.8 0 The Com-
mission must relate its action to the policies underlying regulation
of commerce. This burden can be discharged, however, by a coher-
ent statement of reasons showing the incompatibility of the al-
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) wheth-
er it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes sub-
stantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).
Id. at 244 n.5 (quoting 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964)). Apparently, not all three factors need be
present to support an unfairness charge, nor are the three factors exclusive. See Thain,
supra note 62, at 659. But see Comment, Psychological Advertising: A New Era of FTC Regu-
lation, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08.
19 Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 61 (1972). However, the Commission has refused to up-
hold unfairness charges not supported by "substantial, reliable and probative evidence."
See, e.g., ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 939 (1973).
80 In attempting to define its approach to the unfairness standard, the FTC staff, in
two recent rulemaking reports, has propounded- a two-step analysis. First, "[i]t must be
determined that prohibiting the practice provides greater social or economic benefit than
permitting the practice to continue"; and second, "[i]t must be determined that the prohibi-
tion of a practice . . . is warranted as a legal constraint. This involves the discovery and
definition . . . of the 'public values beyond . . . the antitrust laws."' FTC BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION, STAFF REPORT ON ADVERTISING OF OPHTHALMIC GOODS AND SER-
VICES 216, 217 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OPHTHALMIC GOODS REPORT] (quoting FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244). Accord, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE DISCLOSURES, Ch. V. A., at 7-8 (1974). The 1977 Report is
even more explicit in recognizing that consideration of social benefits and costs-as well as
purely economic ones-should figure into the Commission's decisions. This presumably
reflects the evolution of staff thinking toward a more broadly defined concept of unfair-
ness.
Nevertheless, both staff reports indicate that the FTC can apply its unfairness test
to only a fairly narrow range of traditional "consumer" interests. See id. at 7; OPH-
THALMIC GOODS REPORT, supra, at 214-15. Arguably, our concern with conglomerate merg-
ers that lack discernible "anticompetitive" effects goes beyond the purely ecbnomic inter-
ests of consumers. It may, therefore, be important to our analysis that the relevant interests
of consumers be broadly enough defined to include an interest in averting socially undesir-
able corporate combinations. We believe that such a broad delineation of consumer inter-
ests best complements the Commission's view of § 5 as a "dynamic analytical tool" designed
to deal with social, as well as economic, evils. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
Moreover, the value of the staff reports as an accurate indicator of FTC sentiment is ques-
tionable on two grounds. First, the substantive issues addressed in the reports were ones of
traditional consumer concern; in this setting, there was no reason for the Commission staff
to broaden its definition of consumer interests. And second, the Commission has always
viewed the unfair act standard as particularly applicable to traditional consumer protection
problems; thus, it may well be that the Commission has never really considered whether
the scope of consumer interests might be expanded.
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leged misconduct with the Commission's mandate to protect the
public interest.8'
II'
APPLICATION OF SECTION 5
TO ANTITRUST MATTERS
The Supreme Court has long recognized that section 5 au-
thorizes the FTC not only to enforce the specific commands of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, but also to halt "in their incipiency...
trade restraints and practices deemed undesirable."8 2 Some circuits
have been reluctant to recognize the broad scope of FTC author-
ity,8 3 but numerous Supreme Court cases indicate that the Com-
mission has broad discretion to determine whether conduct is un-
fair in light of the general policies of the antitrust laws.84 Even in
81 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the Commission has broad powers to
declare trade practices unfair." FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966). See
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,
693 (1948). But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
Cir. 1971):
We stand on the threshold of a new era .... For many years, courts have
treated administrative policy decisions with great deference .... On matters of
substance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction
of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative
expertise.
Courts should require administrative officers to articulate the standards
and principles that govern their discretionary decisions ....
Id. at 597-98 (footnote omitted).
82 Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941). Thus, in FTC v. Ce-
ment Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1948), the Court upheld the Commission's condemnation
of base-point pricing even though the Commission did not assert that the conduct violated
the Sherman Act.
83 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 223
(1968); TagMfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 465 (1st Cir. 1949).
1
4 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Adv.
Serv., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953). Litigation involving the major gasoline companies' prac-
tices in the sale of tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) to their dealers is illustrative. In
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 223 (1968), the court of
appeals held that evidence of anticompetitive effects could not be automatically inferred
where Texaco, one of the nation's largest oil companies, induced its dealers-without overt
coercion-to purchase TBA from a specified supplier in return for a commission paid by
the supplier to Texaco. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arrangement was
"inherently coercive" and that "the essential anticompetitive vice" was "the utilization of
economic power in one market to curtail competition in another." 393 U.S. at 229-30
(1968) (quoting Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 (1965)). The Court stated:
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these cases, however, both the Commission and the Court found
the disputed conduct at least potentially anticompetitive, and at
least implicitly made such a finding an essential element of unfair-
ness analysis in cases where the antitrust laws would otherwise gov-
ern.85 Thus, despite its refusal to sanction circuit court limitations
on FTC power, the Supreme Court, without apparent FTC objec-
tion, perpetuated a narrow view of the Commission's authority in
the antitrust area.
In 1972, however, a crucial shift occurred. The Fifth Circuit,
in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC,8 6 had reversed an FTC order
requiring S & H to cease its attempts to block formation of ex-
changes where consumers could trade, buy, or sell various brands
of trading stamps. In reversing the FTC's finding of unfairness,
the circuit court held that the "unfair competition" standard con-
demned only three types of conduct: "(1) a per se violation of
antitrust policy; (2) a violation of the letter of either the Sherman,
Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts; or (3) a violation of the spirit of
these Acts as recognized by the Supreme Court. '8 7 S & H's con-
duct, according to the Fifth Circuit, fell into none of these cate-
gories, and was therefore not unfair.
88
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice White re-
jected the Fifth Circuit's narrow reading of section 5:
While the success of this arrangement in foreclosing competitors from the TBA
market has not matched that of the direct coercion employed by Atlantic, we feel
that the anticompetitive tendencies of such a system are clear, and that the Com-
mission was properly fulfilling the task that Congress assigned it in halting this
practice in its incipiency. The Commission is not required to show that a practice
... has totally eliminated competition .... It is enough that the . . .practice in
question unfairly burdened competition for a not insignificant volume of com-
merce.
393 U.S. at 230.
The Supreme Court did not view the marketing practices involved in the TBA cases as
tie-in arrangements prohibited by § 3 of the Clayton Act or § 1 of the Sherman Act since
the refiners did not overtly condition gasoline sales and dealership grants on dealer pur-
chases of TBA from the designated suppliers. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357,
369 (1965) (dictum). Attempts to seek relief on this theory were unsuccessful in the court
of appeals. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), aff'd sub
nom. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965). Thus, a business practice can constitute
a violation of § 5 even though it does not violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
815 See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225-31 (1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-71 (1965); FTC v.
Motion Picture Adv. Serv., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1948), affid per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v.
FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
86 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
87 432 F.2d at 149-50 (footnote omitted).
88Id. at 150.
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[T]he Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive
power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
89
In taking this stance, the Court emphasized the section 5 prohibi-
tion of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," although it did not
fully separate that phrase from the older "unfair methods of com-
petition" clause. In the pre-S & H period, the Commission had ap-
parently taken a narrow view of unfairness, at least in matters un-
related to traditional consumer protection."0 The S & H case, in a
marked departure from this approach, established that a finding
of unfairness-even in an antitrust-related area-does not require
a demonstration of anticompetitive effect or potential; the chal-
lenged conduct need only contravene an identifiable public policy,
which need not even spring from the antitrust laws. 91
There are those who read the history of section 5 differently.
A. Everette MacIntyre, while still a Federal Trade Commissioner,
coauthored an article in which he argued that S & H merely con-
firmed that practices unfair to consumers need not have anticom-
petitive effects to constitute a violation of section 5.92 MacIntyre
thus read S & H narrowly, viewing the decision only in terms of
consumer protection. Professor Oppenheim, writing prior to S &
H, argued that although section 5 clearly supplements the Sherman
Act, it supplements the Clayton Act only to the extent that it is used
as a vehicle for applying Clayton Act standards to conduct pro-
scribed by the Act's substantive provisions, but outside its jurisdic-
11 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (footnote omitted). Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in consideration of the case. Id. at 234. Even
activities authorized by state law have been held subject to § 5's unfairness standard. See,
e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1976) (unfair use of Illinois
long-arm statute).
90 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
91 See 405 U.S. at 243-44. Interestingly enough, although the Court did not view the S
& H practice of limiting aftermarkets in its stamps as an antitrust violation, similar prac-
tices by S & H have since been found to contravene § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Eastex
Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1975).
92 See MacIntyre & Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and Incipient Unfairness, 41
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 407, 442 (1973). This article focused on the FTC's "mandate to halt
trade restraints in their incipiency" (id. at 409), and suggested that the Commission had
broad--but not fully explored-powers in this regard. See id. at 443-44; Howrey, Utilization
by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTrrRUsT
BULL. 161 (1960); Rahl, Does Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act Extend the Clayton
Act?, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 533 (1960).
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tional bounds. 93 Both of these interpretations, however, reflect the
hesitancy of antitrust-oriented commentators to shift their focus
from economic to broader social and political concerns. More im-
portant, they fail to fully take into account the sweeping language
of section 5.94
S & H teaches another useful lesson. Despite its expansive
reading of section 5, the Court remanded the case to the FTC for
further proceedings because the FTC had failed to relate its actions
to a general finding of unfairness. Rather, the Commission had
attempted to force the case into the traditional antitrust mold.95
Although the Court agreed that the record supported a finding of
unfairness, it insisted that the Commission "[link] its findings and
its conclusions. The opinion is barren of any attempt to rest the
order on its assessment of particular competitive practices or con-
siderations of consumer interests independent of possible or actual
effects on competition. Nor were any standards for doing so referred to
or developed."'96 Thus, the Commission may be obligated and cer-
tainly would be well-advised to develop standards governing agency
action in applying the broad concept of unfairness.97 Providing
93 See Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1961). "[T]he Commission has
jurisdiction under section 5 to attack incipient or consummated Sherman Act offenses." Id.
at 826. However, § 5 "supplements the Clayton Act . . . only when . . . used to reach
transactions and practices economically equivalent to those particularized by the Clayton Act
but not within its coverage because of a jurisdictional deficiency." Id. at 844 n.68 (emphasis
in original).
94 Although the courts have not explicitly dealt with the application of § 5 to mergers,
the FTC has in the past included a § 5 charge in some complaints in addition to alleging a
violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 599
(1966). The purpose of the § 5 charge in these cases was to enable the Commission to
challenge acquisitions of noncorporate assets. More recently, however, the FTC has ap-
peared to include such a charge as a matter of course in merger cases. See, e.g., FTC v.
Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1341-42 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. British Oxygen Co.,
529 F.2d 196, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1976).
In addition, there is good reason to believe that the FTC has the authority under § 5
to order divestiture. Although the only Supreme Court case holds to the contrary (see FTC
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927)), a subsequent case involving a similar statute
declared that such a power existed. See Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 312-13 & nn.17-18 (1963). Moreover, the Court has described the Kodak holding as
"repudiated" (FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966)), and the FTC shares
this view. See In re Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 154 (1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 882
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
95 405 U.S. at 246.
6 Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
9' Rulemaking often provides a mechanism of developing and articulating legal
standards that is preferable to litigation. See Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's En-
forcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385, 390-91 (1964).
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such notice to the business community will help ensure fair applica-
tion of the unfairness standard. In addition, it will further en-
forcement goals by reducing inadvertent violations of section 5. 98
IV
LARGE CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS AS UNFAIR ACTS
Before the FTC condemns a practice as unfair, it must demon-
strate not only that the challenged conduct serves no useful pur-
pose, but also that it contravenes identifiable public policy. At least
98 One last possible objection to a broad reading of § 5 stems from the 1975 amend-
ments to the FTC Act. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a
(1976)). The amendments delineate procedures that the Commission must follow in pro-
mulgating unfairness standards and rules. The Commission must follow certain procedures
for the adoption of "rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1976) (em-
phasis added). However, it can pronounce "interpretive rules and general statements of
policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices" without observing the new
procedures. Id. § 57a(a)(1)(A). Finally, the amendments provide that they "shall not affect
any authority of the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpretive rules), and gen-
eral statements of policy, with respect to unfair methods of competition." Id. § 57a(a)(2).
The amendments thus draw a distinction between "unfair methods of competition" and
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
Since a purpose of the new section was to regulate rulemaking concerning sellers'
activities (see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7714-15), one might conclude that "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" applies only to ongoing practices, and that structural antitrust matters, such
as mergers, are exclusively covered by the phrase "unfair competition." This interpretation
would resurrect the pre-S & H reading of § 5 by requiring some actual or potential anti-
competitive effect for conduct to be deemed unfair, except in the case of sales practices.
Nothing in the legislative history, however, supports such an interpretation. See H.R.
REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702.
Moreover, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 733-34 n.14 (1977), the Supreme
Court rejected the use of legislative history of a closely related act as relevant to construc-
tion of a previously enacted provision. In the context of § 5, such "subsequent history" is,
in any case, of no significance. Congress, in passing the 1975 amendments, was focusing on
the problems arising from FTC efforts to promulgate certain rules of conduct, and sought
to develop a rulemaking process that would serve this goal effectively. See H.R. REP. No.
1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702,7714-
16; Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improve-
ment Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679, 686-90 (1976). In so doing, Congress subjected a
wide-ranging category of activities to special rulemaking procedures. Section 57a does not
seek to confine the broad sweep of FTC authority to declare business practices unfair; it
merely mandates the use of certain procedures before that authority is exercised. Thus, the
1975 amendments do not undercut our argument that § 5's prohibition of unfair acts
covers conglomerate mergers. They only delineate the process of converting our proposal
into practice.
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four separate sources suggest the existence of a public policy
against large conglomerate mergers: the Clayton Act, a pervasive
skepticism running throughout the antitrust laws of excessive size
and control, the concept of federalism with its emphasis on the
decentralization of power, and the general social undesirability in-
herent in large conglomerate mergers. This Article suggests that,
taken together, these sources justify treatment of large conglomer-
ate mergers as unfair acts within the meaning of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
A. The Clayton Act
In 1950 Congress amended section 7 of the Clayton Act. Al-
though Congress clearly intended to expand the Act's coverage, 99 it
retained probable anticompetitive effect as the standard of illegal-
ity. This limitation made sense in 1950. At that time, horizontal
and vertical combinations constituted the vast majority of American
mergers. Conglomerate mergers were rare. It therefore is not sur-
prising that Congress retained the statutory language requiring po-
tential anticompetitiveness, since the combinations that then con-
cerned Congress-horizontal or vertical mergers involving large
business entities-easily satisfied this requirement. 100 In addition,
the requirement gave judges applying the Clayton Act a suffi-
ciently definite standard with which to evaluate the legality of these
combinations. Underlying the standard, however, was a more gen-
eral concern with the problem of economic concentration and the
elimination of independent businesses.' 0 The language of the
Clayton Act makes it difficult to challenge conglomerate acquisi-
tions not because Congress approved of them, but because, in revis-
99See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316-23 (1962); S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4293, 4295; H.R. REP.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1949); Blake, supra note 29, at 584-85. For discussions
of whether courts applying § 7 can develop standards by which to measure noneconomic
value, compare Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965), with
Jones & Blake, In Defense of Antitrust, id. at 377, and Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-
Dimensional Antitrust Policy, id. at 422.
100 See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 4293, 4297; H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
101 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316-23 (1962); S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4293, 4295;
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1949); Blake, supra note 29, at 570-90. See
also Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV.
226, 230-33 (1960). The process of aggregate concentration has continued in the 25 years
since the amendment. See Leonard, Mergers, Industrial Concentration, and Antitrust Policy, 10
J. ECON. ISSUES 354, 355-57 (1976).
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ing the statute, Congress addressed only those types of mergers
that then posed a threat to the economy. 10 2 Indeed, the 1950
Clayton Act amendments at least in part caused the shift from verti-
cal and horizontal mergers to conglomerate combinations. 0 3 This
unintended result illustrates precisely why Congress in 1914 used
both specific statutory prohibitions and general delegations of ad-
ministrative authority in attempting to eradicate undesirable busi-
ness practices.' 0
4
B. General Antitrust Policy
Discernible in the antitrust laws and their judicial interpreta-
tion is a broad policy favoring decentralization of economic pow-
er.10 5 This policy underlies and at least partly explains many areas
of case law. For example, even a scheme of antitrust regulation
focusing only on anticompetitive effects necessarily raises questions
about any merger; by destroying the existence of independent
business entities, mergers threaten the multiplicity of profit-seekers
upon which our competitive economy depends. 0 6
The concept of the least restrictive alternative, commonly in-
voked in rule-of-reason inquiries, also reflects this broad concern:
because society values freedom and flexibility so highly, it will pay
102 Some commentators believe that Congress may have viewed all large mergers as
sufficiently anticompetitive to be illegal. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 29, at 579-85; Bok,
supra note 101, at 230-33. Economic arguments exist to justify this view. See Edwards, supra
note 39, at 331-52; Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 927-28
(1976); Mueller, supra note 37, at 461-76.
103 "During 1951-1958, about 75 percent (measured in assets) of all acquisitions by
corporations with $1 billion in assets involved horizontal mergers. In subsequent years this
percentage dwindled-to below 10 percent by the late 1960s." Mueller, Antitrust in a Planned
Economy: An Anachronism or an Essential Complement?, 9 J. ECON. IssuEs 159, 168-69 (1975).
See also FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, supra note 14, at 98, 105.
104 For a discussion of the dual framework of the Clayton Act and § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, see notes 48-63 and accompanying text supra.
105 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316, 333 (1962) (Warren, C.J.);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.);
A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 429-31 (2d ed. 1970);
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 2, at 11 (1977); Blake, supra note 29,
at 574-79; Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 13 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); Dorsey, Free Enter-
prise vs. The Entrepreneur: Redefining the Entities Subject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1244, 1246-47 (1977); Elzinga, supra note 44, at 1196-1200; Hofstadter, What Hap-
pened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT 113 (E. Cheit ed. 1969);
Scherer, supra note 44, at 980.
106 One commentator argues that entrepreneurial freedom is essential to the com-
prehensive definition of the competitive process which the antitrust laws protect. See Dor-
sey, supra note 105.
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no more than the absolute minimum for the advantages of anti-
competitive behavior. While the least restrictive alternative ap-
proach is economically justifiable, 10 7 it also reflects a general abhor-
rence of excessive control over otherwise independent entities.'0 8
This same policy cuts against conglomerate mergers that unneces-
sarily eliminate corporate independence and freedom of action.
The recurring tension in antitrust cases over the role and rele-
vance of size also suggests the existence of a public policy against
conglomerate mergers. Although the Supreme Court has accepted
the proposition that size alone is not an offense, 10 9 it has also rec-
ognized that "size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is
not to be ignored."" 0 Some businesses must be large. Courts, how-
ever, remain aware that size may create power, and that power can
be misused. Moreover, while considerations of size come into play
whenever a large firm expands through merger, the size factor is
particularly relevant where two large firms seek to join forces.
Finally, an old line of cases under the Sherman Act has
suggested that mergers between large firms may be unreasonable
restraints of trade even though the elimination of competition is
slight when measured in terms of market share."' For example, a
district court found unreasonable a combination of two New York
banks, which, although large in terms of total deposits and loans,
held very small shares of the relevant national banking market.
12
The market shares were so small and the evidence of anticompeti-
tive potential so slight that the court could not find a section 7
violation. 1 3 The court held, however, that because the merging
banks were in competition and were large in absolute size, the
1o'See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division
(pts. 1, 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 801-05 (1965); 75 YALE L.J. 373, 388-90 (1966).
10" See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309-14
(1949); A. NEALE, supra note 105, at 427-32.
109 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
110 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
"'See United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214, 229-32 (1922); United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 56-64 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61,
85-98 (1912); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 231-32 (1904). But see United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
112 See United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). The case was not appealed, but the 1966 amendments to the Bank Merger Act (12
U.S.C. § 18 28 (c)( 7 ) (1976)) reversed its result by exempting bank mergers that comply with
the Act from all antitrust laws except § 2 of the Sherman Act.
13See 240 F. Supp. at 952-55.
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combination constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act."
4
C. Decentralization and the Concept of Federalism
In identifying a public policy favoring decentralization of de-
cisionmaking, courts need look no farther than federalism. At bot-
tom, federalism recognizes the superior ability of local authorities
to deal with local problems. 15 Although local expertise may at
times be illusory, or produce undesirable results," 6 federal author-
ities-as a matter of political necessity and governmental efficiency
-often commit difficult or detailed decisionmaking to local policy-
makers.
117
As in the public sector, decentralization of private economic
units facilitates sensitivity to local tastes and preferences, while cen-
tralization creates strong pressures toward uniformity. Thus, even
where large conglomerates give local managers wide discretion,
final authority ultimately rests in the hands of a distant, unknown
few. The power to hire and fire the manager inevitably lies in
centralized control; even if ostensibly given a free reign, the local
manager, conscious of this sanction, will shape his behavior accord-
ingly.
Equally undesirable is the augmentation of political power
which results from centralization of business ownership." 8 Recent
disclosures of unlawful corporate contributions made in an effort
to mold and control the governmental process provide forceful
reminders of the risks to an open political system that concen-
trations of economic wealth create. Even without overt corruption,
large corporations have special leverage over the legislative and
executive branches which provides them with protections and sup-
ports not available to smaller firms. 19
114 See id. at 955.
"' "[T]he National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
"'xSee, e.g., Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (enjoining misappli-
cation of Revenue Sharing funds by city officials).
'17 See, e.g., Revenue Sharing Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1264 (1976) (as amended).
I'l "One of the most potent economies of scale of large conglomerate firms is ... the
effective presentation of their case for favorable treatment by government." Blake, supra
note 29, at 591. Blake also points to the ability of conglomerates to "mobilize special inter-
est support from a much wider range of sources." Id.




As the three preceding subsections suggest, unnecessary eco-
nomic concentration is inconsistent with the policies underlying
both antitrust law and the concept of federalism. This does not
mean, however, that large corporate entities are always undesir-
able. Indeed, they may be essential to our economic and social well-
being. 20 Nevertheless, we must evaluate any additional aggrega-
tion of economic power by carefully balancing the advantages and
disadvantages to society.
Large institutions, especially large corporations, present sub-
stantial risks to fundamental societal values. The unchecked con-
centration of power in a small number of institutions threatens
both individual freedom of action and majoritarian political de-
cisionmaking. Discretionary power 121 can produce desirable results,
but it also permits arbitrary decisions detrimental to the common
good. Centralized decisionmakers, far removed from the areas af-
fected by their actions, may choose a course that substantially and
needlessly disrupts the lives of their employees and the stability of
entire communities. 22 Centralized control also limits the discretion
of local management to deploy their resources and distribute re-
wards, 23 thereby diminishing opportunities for individual achieve-
ment, independence, and self-expression. 24 Individual employ-
ees are forced to conform to the demands and expectations of
this point. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1971, at 1, col. 1 (House approves loan); id., Aug. 3,





See D. LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEw ERA 97-130 (1953).
121 Discretionary power is the "range of managerial choice not dictated by or fully
predictable from pure profit maximizing behavior." Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers:
A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 35 (1977). It is the power "to make decisions that
affect the lives of other people." Dewey, supra note 105, at 11 n.18. Discretionary power is
well illustrated by the problems that United Artists is currently having with its conglomer-
ate parent. See Schuyton, United Artists Script Calls for Divorce, FORTUNE, Jan. 16, 1978, at
130. Company towns are extreme examples of private discretionary power. See H. CAUDILL,
NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS 98-137 (1963).
122 For example, decisions to open, close, alter, or move plants affect countless persons
whose welfare may not have been considered in the decisionmaking process.
123 See Schuyton, supra note 121. A sociologist has presented the case in these terms:
[O]rganizations are tools for shaping the world as one wishes it to be shaped. ...
The man who controls an organization has power that goes far beyond that of
those that do not have any such control. The power of the rich lies not in their
ability to buy goods and services, but in their capacity to control the ends toward
which the vast resources of large organizations are directed.
C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZArIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 14 (1972).
124 See Dorsey, supra note 105, at 1264.
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distant managers. 12 5 Although centralization of power is to some
extent inevitable, a reduction in the number of independent eco-
nomic institutions also reduces the number of alternatives available
to the affected community or employee. The bureaucracy of large
organizations "inevitably concentrates [social resources] in the
hands of a few who are prone to use them for ends we do not
approve of, for ends we are generally not aware of, and more
frightening still, for ends we are led to accept because we are not in
a position to conceive alternative ones."'
126
Centralized economic power can also damage our political
processes. A sufficiently large corporation can dominate an entire
community and totally subvert its democratic system.' 27 If nothing
else, size provides political access and an ability to press one's claims
in ways unavailable to smaller entities.' 28 Pushed to the extreme,
large organizations can corrupt 29 and even destroy political sys-
tems.13 0 A coalition of independent entities, regardless of their sol-
idarity, can never achieve equivalent power.'
3 '
Reducing the number of centralized economic entities exacer-
bates all these problems. It broadens the scope of unbridled discre-
tion each remaining entity enjoys. And as the number of firms
decreases, so does the probability that their efforts to manipulate
the social environment will be varied and, perhaps, offsetting.1
3 2
Furthermore, the agglomeration of power entrenches control by
raising economic and psychological barriers to entry into the mar-
125 See generally W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
126 C. PERROW, supra note 123, at 7.
127 See H. CAUDILL, supra note 121, at 98-137.
128 See Blake, supra note 29, at 591; Elzinga, supra note 44, at 1197-98. See also C.
PERROW, supra note 123, at 14; Adams, Corporate Power and Economic Apologetics: A Public
Policy Perspective, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 105, at
360, 366-68.
12
9 See A. SAMPSON, THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ITT 181-258 (1973); Adams, supra note
128, at 366-68 (reviewing ITT's power and lobbying efforts).
130 The best known recent example is the overthrow of the regime in Chile. See Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
on the International Telephone & Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-71, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. 1-2 (1973).
131 See D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). See also F. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 160 (1970) (outlining factors caus-
ing cartels to break down).
132 This follows because power arises from limited choice and because greater numbers
of organizations make common understandings among them much more difficult. Cf.
McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
191, 197-204 (1960) (describing conditions for cartel action, which seemingly apply to other
situations involving collective conduct).
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ketplace and the political arena.
133
Relating these considerations to the evaluation of large con-
glomerate mergers requires a social cost-benefit analysis. We feel
that these mergers are socially undesirable in this larger sense.
They produce few, if any, social or economic advantages to coun-
terbalance the harm flowing from greater concentration and fewer
sources of power. This social undesirability constitutes an indepen-
dent basis for opposition to large conglomerate mergers.
34
V
A PROPOSED SECTION 5 RuLE COVERING
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that conglomerate merg-
ers-even assuming that they have no anticompetitive effects-
are potentially "unfair" within the meaning of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. This conclusion, however, necessitates a further
inquiry: How can the FTC best implement a policy against unfair
mergers without prohibiting necessary or desirable conglomerate
combinations? The Supreme Court's discussion in S & H properly
suggests that principles of unfairness are usually better explained
through rulemaking than through case-by-case review.'3 5 The FTC
should therefore promulgate a rule dealing with conglomerate
mergers. The rule must identify those mergers that may qualify as
unfair, articulate guidelines governing application of the unfair-
ness standard in specific cases, and provide sanctions for violation.
We offer the following rule as a model for FTC action:
The merger of two independent firms will be reviewable under
this rule as an unfair act within the meaning of section 5 only if
each firm has a value or annual sales of $100 million or more.
The initial unfairness of reviewable combinations involving two
firms, each with value or annual sales in excess of $250 million,
will be conclusively presumed. The initial unfairness of review-
133 Cf. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 11-41 (1956) (outlining determinants of
barriers to entry in industry).
134 We do not purport to make an exhaustive analysis here of the claim that large
conglomerate mergers are socially undesirable. The purpose of this Article is to dem-
onstrate that an alternative legal standard exists-i.e., the unfairness standard-by which to
evaluate these mergers. At this juncture, we think it suffices to suggest the factual bases for
our views without undertaking to prove them conclusively. Should the FTC consider adopt-
ing a conglomerate merger rule akin to our suggestion (see notes 135-64 and accompanying
text infra), a more searching evaluation of social costs and benefits would be required.
131 See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
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able combinations in which one participant has value or annual
sales of less than $250 million and the other has value or annual
sales of more than $250 million will be decided on a case-by-case
basis. The initial unfairness of reviewable combinations in which
each participant has value or annual sales of less than $250 mil-
lion will also be decided on a case-by-case basis. In all cases the
merging parties shall have opportunity to overcome a finding of
initial unfairness by proving that their combination involves a
failing firm whose failure could not otherwise be avoided, or
that it produces or is likely to produce substantial, demonstrable
economies or efficiencies not otherwise achievable (i.e., that
could not be achieved through other means, including combina-
tions not presumptively unfair). Proof of the existence of one or
both of these defenses precludes the finding of a violation un-
der this rule. However, where both parties to the merger have
value or annual sales of less than $250 million, the Commission
shall bear the burden of demonstrating the inapplicability of
both defenses. The remedy for an "unfair" acquisition is divesti-
ture of either (a) the acquired assets, or (b) other assets of the
resulting corporation roughly equal in value to the assets ac-
quired. Divestitures must result in the re-creation of a viable,
independent entity of at least the same size in terms of value or
sales as the acquired firm. For purposes of this rule, the term
"initial unfairness" refers to the unfairness of the merger given
that neither defense applies. Where the initial unfairness of the
merger is not conclusively presumed, the Commission, in resolv-
ing the issue, shall consider primarily the size of the parties and
the size of the resulting entity, but shall also consider the level of
concentration in the industries affected by the merger, possible
anticompetitive consequences of the merger, the probability of
resulting economies or efficiencies not sufficient to constitute a
defense under this rule, and any other factor bearing on the so-
cial or economic desirability of the merger.
1 3 6
136 It is not clear whether the FTC could implement our proposal by an interpretive
rule and general statement of policy under 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (1976), or whether it
would have to use 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1976), which governs the adoption of rules de-
fining unfair acts "with specificity." See note 98 supra. While the former section involves less
rigorous procedures, the latter applies to rules that have greater legal force. The latter
would, of course, better facilitate FTC enforcement efforts.
For the purposes of effective enforcement, we have chosen to structure our proposal
as a substantive rule (see note 32 supra), and, as a consequence, the more stringent proce-
dural requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) would have to be followed. Neverthe-
less, the rule is also intended to serve as a guideline to firms in very much the same
fashion as would a general statement of policy. For example, where the two merging par-
ties each have over $250 million in value or sales, the FTC is very likely to challenge the
merger since, under the rule, initial unfairness is conclusively presumed. On the other
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A. Categories
1. Delineating Categories Based on Size
Classification of businesses on the basis of size necessarily in-
volves some arbitrariness. A workable rule must draw lines some-
where, and the premise of our model is that the larger the merging
firms, the more "unfair" the combination. Our proposal separates
firms into three categories based on value 137 and/or annual sales: 138
(1) the $250-million-plus category; (2) the $100-250 million cate-
gory; and (3) the $100-million-minus category. The proposed rule
recognizes that even the largest mergers may produce substantial
social benefits and economic efficiencies. In any size category,
therefore, defenses are available.
In drawing one critical line at $250 million we sought to iden-
tify those firms that possess sufficient resources and capacity to
meet almost any economic challenge. In general, firms in the
$250-million-plus category have already achieved all economies of
scale with regard to research and development. 139 Their size pro-
vides access to public and private capital markets on favorable
terms. 4 ° These firms have already demonstrated significant
hand, where both parties are in the $100-250 million category, the FTC must prove not
only initial unfairness, but also that neither of the defenses apply. Given these cir-
cumstances, the merging firms should realize that FTC action is unlikely. Because of this
dual function of our proposal-i.e., substantive rule and guideline-the ensuing discussion
is couched both in terms of what types of mergers are unfair and what types of mergers
the FTC should challenge.
Our rule is not intended to foreclose the use of § 5 to reach mergers not involving the
acquisition of corporate assets. Nor is it intended to constitute an exclusive definition of
when a conglomerate merger is an unfair act. We do suggest, however, that any other
definition also be embodied in a rule, and not invoked on an ad hoc basis.
13 Since book values are so much a product of accounting, we prefer to measure a
firm's value by adding the amount of its debt to the market price of its equity securities, or,
in the case of an acquired firm, the value put on those securities by the acquirer. In the
GE-UI merger, for example (see notes 4-11 and accompanying text supra). GE put a value
of nearly $2 billion on UI's assets, although UI carried those assets on its books at only $1
billion. See Boards of GE, Utah International Clear Talks for $1.9 Billion Merger, supra note 4;
The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 6.
138 Our proposal lumps value and sales together in drawing distinctions among the
three categories of firms. We envision that where a particular firm falls into two categories
(e.g., $300 million in sales and $150 million in value) it should be placed in the higher
category (i.e., the $250-million-plus category). Ultimately, the best route may be to break
down sales and value using different dollar amounts and to combine both value and sales
figures in constructing operative categories.
139 See F. SCHFRER, supra note 131, at 360. Available data indicate that among the 500
largest firms increase in size does not lead to more than a proportionate increase in the
input or output of research and development. Id.
140 Large firms are likely to have already issued publicly traded securities, and the
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growth through either internal expansion or acquisition. 141 In
short, despite wide variations in size, virtually all firms with over
$250 million in value or annual sales have such substantial eco-
nomic capacity that precluding mergers involving them will gener-
ally not result in adverse economic consequences.
Firms in the $100-250 million category, on the other hand,
may or may not be industry leaders. When a single, integrated
cement operation can cost over $150 million, 142 a cement firm in
the $100-250 million category may not be viable. Since combina-
tions involving firms of this size vary greatly in resulting efficien-
cies and social desirability, their social utility or disutility cannot be
presumed. Case-by-case analysis is therefore necessary.
Finally, we draw a line at $100 million. Firms in the $100-
million-minus category frequently may be unable to reach efficient
size. Often, they cannot generate sufficient capital through the se-
curities markets.' 43 Mergers involving firms in this size range thus
provide the greatest potential for the promotion of economic ef-
ficiencies and competition. The unavailability of our rule to attack
such mergers also serves to decrease transaction costs for the con-
solidation of small firms, which are less able to bear the expense of
protracted litigation.'
44
2. Alternatives to Proposed Size-Based Categories
Measures of value and annual sales are not the only indices
of "unfairness." A rule addressing conglomerate mergers could
focus instead on the ranks of the acquired and acquiring firms. A
rule based on size rather than rank, however, reflects a basic pol-
icy underlying our proposal-to maximize the number of large
firms in the economy and not merely maintain some set number.
substantial public disclosure about their activities will usually overcome any reluctance on
the part of investors to consider the merits of an offering. In addition, the size and diver-
sity of most large firms decreases the risk of investing in them.
141 See Leonard, supra note 101, at 355-58. But among the nation's 500 largest firms,
those below the top 200 have been growing even faster than the 200 largest. Id. at 380
n.26.
1
4 2 See Wall St. J., May 31, 1977, at 13, col. 4.
143 The costs and difficulties associated with public offerings can be very great. See
WHEN CORPORATIONS GO PUBLIC (C. Israels & G. Duff, Jr. eds. 1962). These firms may also
encounter serious problems in finding private venture capital investors. See Bylinsky, New
Companies That Beat the Odds, FORTUNE, Dec. 1977, at 76-77. See also note 140 supra.
144 Defending a transaction, even against a preliminary investigation, is expensive.
Since the benefits perceived by the acquiring company must justify the transaction costs
and since acquisition of a smaller company will generally produce a smaller benefit, raising
transaction costs for this category of firms could substantially deter desirable acquisitions.
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We have thus rejected a rank-based rule. Similarly, we have re-
jected a formulation focusing on the size of the resulting entity.
Because such an approach does not consider the relative signifi-
cance of the combining firms, it sweeps too broadly; our proposal
seeks only to limit mergers between large entities. This is not to
say that more workable and useful categories could not be con-
structed. At the very least, changing economic conditions will
necessitate adjustments in our proposed dollar amounts.4 5
B. Operation of the Proposed Rule
The proposed rule creates four categories of mergers based on
the three size categories: (1) mergers involving two firms in the
$250-million-plus range; (2) mergers involving one firm in $250-
million-plus category and one in the $100-250 million category;
(3) mergers involving two firms in the $100-250 million category;
and (4) mergers involving at least one firm in the $100-million-
minus range. Our proposed rule treats each of these merger types
differently and can be schematically summarized as follows:
Value or Value or
Sales of Sales of Treatment of Treatment of
Firm 1 Firm 2 Unfairness Issue Defenses
250+ 250+ conclusively pre- defendant must
sumed unfair prove existence
250+ 100-250 FTC must prove defendant must
prove existence
100-250 100-250 FTC must prove FTC must prove
nonexistence
100- any amount merger not re-
viewable under
this rule
Our proposal conclusively presumes unfairness where each of
two merging firms falls into the $250-million-plus category. Draw-
ing upon antitrust principles governing mergers,146 the presump-
145 It might be prudent, for example, to peg the dollar figures of our rule to an index
reflecting inflation, such as the cost-of-living index.
146 See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). Cf. United States v.
Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (concentration in acquired bank's market created
presumptive probability of anticompetitive effect, rebutted by showing that other means of
market entry were impractical for acquirer); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
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tion of unfairness would not be directly rebuttable. The merging
parties might, however, avert a finding of a section 5 violation by
establishing one of the defenses recognized in our proposal.
Where a firm in the $250-million-plus category merges with
one in the $100-250 million range, no presumption arises. The
merger, however, may be challenged as unfair. By placing busi-
nesses on notice of this risk, the rule will encourage acquisitions of
smaller firms more likely to benefit from economies of size.
Moreover, a case-by-case analysis will maximize the FTC's flexibility
in sorting out mergers that may be contrary to the public interest.
Where neither party to the merger can point to significant result-
ing advantages and one of the parties is well over the $250 million
threshold, the merger should be deemed unfair. The Commission
should also move against combinations resulting in some discern-
ible loss of competitive potential even if the loss is too small to
trigger application of the antitrust laws. 147
Where both merging parties are in the $100-250 million
category, our proposal imposes on the FTC the burden of dem-
onstrating that neither defense applies. Although in rare cases such
combinations should be challenged under our rule, their regulation
will, in general, be left to the antitrust laws.
Finally, the proposed rule precludes reviewability of mergers
where either merging firm falls within the $100-million-minus cat-
egory. Mergers between firms of this size generally do not raise
serious public policy questions beyond the probable competitive
effect of the transaction, and therefore do not warrant special FTC
consideration. These last two provisions free most acquisitions
from FTC review under the rule, and will thus permit the Commis-
sion to focus its attention on large conglomerate mergers.
C. Limitation of the Rule to Acquisitions of Independent Firms
Our proposed rule does not cover the acquisition of one cor-
poration's assets by another corporation where the transaction does
not eliminate an independent entity. Such asset acquisitions do not
have the same potential for unfairness as full-fledged mergers.
U.S. 486 (1974) (market shares of merging firms made merger presumptively illegal, but
showing that acquired firm could not maintain its share justified denying presumption
conclusive effect).
147 Presumably, the standard of competitive effect for invoking § 5 is lower than that for
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. Incipient anticompetitive conduct, unripened into an antitrust vio-
lation, has long been recognized as a basis for invoking § 5. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966).
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Although their asset mixes are altered, buyer and seller both re-
main active, ongoing entities. We recognize the danger of piecemeal
dismemberment that this approach creates. If that risk materializes,
additional definitional provisions should solve the problem. Similar





Mergers involving failing firms15 0 do not eliminate viable in-
dependent businesses. Our proposed rule recognizes this fact by
establishing a failing firm defense.' 51 In applying the failing firm
principle, antitrust law would rank prospective buyers by the de-
gree of anticompetitive effect. 152 It is unlikely that such ranking
will prove useful in plugging the failing firm defense into "unfair"
merger analysis. At the very least it will severely complicate such
inquiries. 15 We therefore believe that a showing of a failing condi-
tion on the part of the acquired firm and the need for a large
conglomerate buyer should justify an otherwise "unfair" merger.
54
In advocating the failing firm defense, we recognize that with-
out the merger, "failure" might well result in dismemberment of
the firm in bankruptcy and the creation of several new entities,
perhaps all large corporations. However, we discern in our legal
order a clear preference for the preservation and continuation of
productive activity, in contrast to the dislocations and upheavals
that bankruptcy may entail.
148 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 337; 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.337 to 1.337-6 (1976).
149 See, e.g., Reclassification of Securities, Mergers, Consolidations and Acquisitions of
Assets, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1977).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
151 But cf. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 189 (1968) (requiring fail-
ing bank to explore alternatives to merger).
152 See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971);
Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
153 For example, it would have to be determined whether a merger involving a large
acquirer operating in a few lines of business was less desirable than one involving a smaller
acquirer operating in many lines of business. For the present, we do not think it necessary
to attempt to refine the unfairness analysis to this extent.




2. Substantial Economies or Social Advantages
Our proposal assumes that a social cost-benefit analysis tips
heavily against conglomerate mergers. This premise, we are confi-
dent, will generally prove true. In some cases, however, it will
not.155 Our proposal therefore permits merging firms to defend
against unfairness charges by demonstrating substantial, specific
economic advantages resulting from the transaction. We suggest
that if such a showing is made, the merger may not be condemned
as unfair, even if its unfair aspects are substantial. Arguably, our
position is too lenient. Perhaps the Commission is capable of
balancing proven gains against the quantum of unfairness that it
perceives in a given merger, and thus forming a rational basis for
forbidding even those mergers that involve substantial benefits. In
our view, however, judgments of this type entail too great a poten-
tial for unjustifiable ad hoc decisionmaking. At least at the outset,
therefore, we opt for a limited discretion in evaluating this defense:
if it appears that the merger will produce or has produced substan-
tial economies or advantages not otherwise obtainable, it should not
be subjected to a balancing test allowing a finding of unfairness.
To make the general rule effective, however, this defense must
be rigorously controlled. It is not enough to show private advan-
tage to buyer and seller. Nor is it sufficient to point to vague
advantages such as increased productivity. To qualify, the benefit
must be sufficiently indentifiable and quantifiable so that its
character and value are clear. In addition, the merging parties,
when advocating this defense, must persuade the Commission that
no lawful, feasible alternative exists for achieving the purported
advantage. 56 This requirement is likely to eliminate most financing
advantages as a basis for the defense since financing will generally
be obtainable in a variety of ways-including joint ventures with
other firms.15 7 The advantageous nature of the program to be
financed will normally, of itself, indicate financibility. These restric-
'5 Cf. United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (state law barriers to de
novo entry invalidated presumptive anticompetitive effect of bank merger); United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (depleted nature of reserves of one merg-
ing party made normal competitive inferences invalid).
156 See United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 185-92 (1968).
1
57 Joint ventures, of course, also involve antitrust risks. See Brodley, The Legal Status of
Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANT TRUST BULL. 453
(1976); Pfeffer & Nowak, Patterns of Joint Venture Activity: Implication for Antitrust Policy, 21
ANTITRUST BULL. 315 (1976).
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tions will ensure that the economic-advantages defense covers only
truly unique advantages not otherwise achievable. It thus will serve
a useful purpose without swallowing the rule.
E. Sanctions
One possible reaction to unfair mergers would be to bar con-
solidation of the parties or to require immediate divestiture of the
acquired company. We reject this view as too shortsighted and
inflexible. Our objective is to preserve and increase over the long
term the number of independent firms of substantial size in our
economy. We therefore perceive no risk in allowing acquisitions
immediately preceded by or quickly followed by divestiture of
other assets and resulting in no net change in the number of large
firms. Large corporations that foresee profitable uses for assets
owned by others should be able to acquire those assets as long as
they promptly effectuate matching divestitures.1
5 8
The form of divestiture is important. In general, divestiture
should involve the creation of a new viable corporation of roughly
the same size as the acquired entity. This can be accomplished
through a spinoff 159 or public sale of stock. Alternatively, matching
assets can be transferred to some smaller corporation- 60 to achieve
the same effect-the creation of a major new entity. Speed is also
important.' 6' The FTC should establish and enforce firm deadlines
for divestiture. If deadlines are not met, the FTC should not only
impose fines, 62 it should appoint a trustee to take possession of,
operate, and dispose of the property. 63
Corporations making acquisitions they know to be prohibited
158 The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has adopted this approach in
negotiating consent decrees in conglomerate merger cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ling-
Temco-Vought, Inc., [1970] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 73,105 (W.D. Pa.); cases cited in note 27
supra.
159 This is what Procter & Gamble did after its acquisition of Clorox was held illegal in
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
160 We propose that, absent unusual circumstances, such a corporation be in the
$100-million-minus category.
161 For illustrations of the risks and problems attending divestiture, see United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 410 U.S. 962 (1973), affg mem. 358 F. Supp. 820 (D. Colo. 1972);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.) (affirming FTC order to divest),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1972), enforced, 542 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1976) (denying motion to
modify order), enforced, [1976-2] TRADE CAS. 61,162 (10th Cir.) (FTC contempt action
held in abeyance pending efforts to bring about divestiture).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Papercraft Corp., 540 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976).
1'3 In the ITT divestiture cases (see note 27 supra), the court has now named trustees
to take, operate and sell some of the assets.
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would have a short time to arrange an acceptable divestiture plan
with the FTC. This plan would establish deadlines, designate di-
vestable assets, and name a trustee to take charge of them in the
event of default. Corporations choosing to litigate the legality of
their acquisitions would, upon losing, have to accept the Commis-
sion's designation of assets to be divested. This scheme should en-
courage settlement as well as prompt divestiture.
Allowing divestiture, especially divestiture of assets other than
those acquired, is not without risk. The new corporation may not
be as strong or able as the old one. It may be saddled with large
debt, old plants, bad markets, or weak management. FTC review of
conglomerate divestitures will reduce these dangers. Moreover, the
Commission will be aided in this regard by the securities laws,
which frequently impose liability on various parties for failure to




In our proposal to make some mergers illegal regardless of
their anticompetitive potential, we have included only those merg-
ers that we view as most troublesome: large conglomerate merg-
ers. Such mergers generally produce no significant social or eco-
nomic advantages and result in a net social loss even if neutral in
economic terms. On the other hand, the threat of acquisition may
stimulate efficient corporate behavior, and in some cases large con-
glomerate combinations will make good economic sense. To protect
these interests while simultaneously minimizing the permanent
elimination of major independent entities, we have proposed a
flexible rule for assessing unfairness. In addition, we have framed
a remedy that allows divestiture of alternative assets instead of
flatly forbidding all unfair mergers.
Our proposed rule would, to be sure, complicate corporate
takeovers planned by large firms. The problem would be far from
insurmountable, however, even in cases of violation, since in most
massive firms specific units generally possess a high degree of au-
tonomy and can thus be divested without serious difficulty. Al-
though added costs and risks will render marginally profitable
164See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976); Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10, 14, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n, 78r (1976).
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takeovers less attractive, our rule should not interfere significantly
with combinations expected to generate substantial increases in
profit. Nor will our rule stop trends toward concentration of pro-
ductive assets if such trends reflect genuine efficiencies of size.
165
Nonetheless, by severely restricting the ability of massive firms to
merge, our proposal should cause the number of large firms to
increase more rapidly than in the past. And by increasing the
number of large firms in the economy, the rule will operate to
preserve the social, political, and economic advantages resulting
from the multiplicity of actors at work in our society, while at the
same time retaining whatever advantages bigness produces.
In limiting our proposal to large mergers, we have not rejected
the possibility of extending section 5 to cover all acquisitions by
large firms or all combinations involving some lesser dollar values.
Such an approach, however, will require different justifications
from those that support condemnation of large mergers.
In operation, our rule might bar only a handful of mergers.
Although precise data are not available, it appears that among
more than 500 acquisitions of mining and manufacturing com-
panies in 1976 only thirteen acquired firms had assets exceeding
$100 million and only five had assets over $200 million.' 66 Our
proposal, therefore, will not affect the great majority of acquisitions.
It will instead isolate those few combinations with particularly un-
desirable social and political implications.
Our proposal attempts to avoid the Clayton Act requirement
of a showing of a probable "substantial" anticompetitive effect.
This approach does not require resolution of the question of
whether conglomerate mergers are anticompetitive per se. Econo-
mists have only recently begun to address this question, and they
are still far from a consensus. 167 We glean a single proposition
from this presently muddled state of affairs: conglomerate mergers
produce few discernible benefits, whatever their adverse economic
effects might be.
165 More than half of past increases in the share of manufacturing assets possessed by
the top 200 firms has resulted from internal expansion. Leonard, supra note 101, at 360.
166 See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, supra note 14, at 99. This report uses "book asset"
figures and does not provide the sales figures or the value of consideration paid in the
merger or acquisition. Thus, accurate determination of how many of these mergers would
fall within the scope of our rule is not possible.
167 Compare P. STEINER, supra note 14, with Mueller, supra note 37, and Markovits, supra
note 102. Some economists view the issue of anticompetitiveness as varying from market to
market. See J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION (1969). Others
see mergers as manifestations of managerial power that are contrary to efficiency and
shareholder interests. See S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY (1968).
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We recognize a potential objection to our method of curtailing
large mergers as an evasion of the appropriate legislative route or
as an undue delegation of administrative power. We invoke section
5, however, partly for pragmatic reasons. Congress reacts better
than it initiates. 168 It may alter or eliminate FTCjurisdiction as to a
class of cases, and it has done so in the past.169 FTC implementa-
tion of our proposal would force Congress to consider explicitly
what rules should govern conglomerate mergers. Moreover, initial
regulation by administrative rules allows more flexible application
and alteration than regulation by statute.
Beyond these pragmatic arguments, we believe that the history
of section 5, its expansion by Congress in 1938, and the recent
amendments designed to clarify procedures for implementing the
sweeping "unfairness" standard indicate a congressional policy
favoring the broad construction of FTC powers to deal with mat-
ters of business conduct. The unfairness standard is unspecific by
design. Congressional silence charges the FTC with applying it to
specific problems.
The vagueness of the unfairness standard does not, however,
provide the FTC with unbridled authority to apply its collective
conscience as it chooses. The S & H case, even as it expanded the
agency's prerogatives, required that principles of unfairness rest on
well-established public policy. More important, S & H mandates
that the FTC explain the underlying bases of its decisions. S & H
correctly expands the policies on which the FTC might rely; but
careful identification and articulation of the nexus between those
policies and proposed Commission action remains essential. If "un-
fairness" proves too general a guide, Congress retains the authority
and responsibility to alter it. Congress, after all, passed the FTC
168 For example, initial FTC regulatory action on cigarette advertising triggered spe-
cific congressional legislation. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965), as amended by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976)). Similarly, court
construction of statutes has frequently led to congressional legislative clarification. See, e.g.,
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (applying § 7 of Clayton Act
to bank mergers, leading Congress to amend Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. §§
1811-1832 (1976)) to exempt consummated bank mergers from certain antitrust laws); Fed-
eral Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (disapproving FMB's shipping
rate structure, inducing passage of Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762).
169 See, e.g., The Wheeler-Lea amendment, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (amending
Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976))
(see notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra). Congressional action on cigarette labeling
and advertising (see note 168 supra) preempted FTC regulations, but did not entirely re-
move Commission jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1336 (1976).
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Act. We merely propose that the Commission exercise the powers
granted to it to their fullest.'
CONCLUSION
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides the primary legal device
for challenging conglomerate mergers. Section 7's requirement of
probable anticompetive effect has, however, frustrated attempts to
block such combinations. By eliminating vital independent entities,
massive mergers undercut antitrust policy and contravene signifi-
cant social policies. These effects, in our view, mark such mergers,
regardless of their anticompetitive impact, as "unfair" acts prohib-
ited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
We propose a rule that the FTC could adopt to combat these
mergers. This rule would represent a major step toward bringing
conglomerate mergers under effective legal control.
171 The constitutional problems inherent in broad congressional grants of discretionary
authority to administrative agencies are beyond the scope of this Article. It is to be noted,
however, that the history of courts sustaining such grants of authority is a long one. See,
e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op.,
Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
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